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The Stability and Growth Pact is under fire. Some countries are meeting major problems in sticking to the rules.
Proposals to reform the Pact or ditch it altogether abound. The alleged weaknesses of the Pact tend to reflect trade-offs
typical of supra-national arrangements. This aspect has to be factored in when considering reforms of the current fiscal
rules: there is no miracle solution. EMU without rules would be an interesting experiment, but a risky policy option. Given
the existing degree of political integration in EMU, internal adjustment rather than attempting to redesign the
rules from scratch appears a more suitable way forward. Redefining the medium-term budgetary target, improving
transparency, tackling the pro-cyclical fiscal bias in good times, moving towards non-partisan application of the
rules, and improving transparency in the data can achieve both stronger discipline and higher flexibility.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is one of the
pillars of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It
is a disciplinary device aiming at ensuring sound
budgetary balances and low public debts.
While widely regarded as a major innovation (Artis,
2002), the Pact has been the subject of a heated
controversy ever since its inception. It has been
extensively criticized by academics and opinion-
makers. Proposals for radical changes have been
put forward and even the suppression of the Pact
has been considered. This debate has accelerated in
2002 under the influence of public finance develop-
ments in a number of euro-area countries which
have called into question its effectiveness and wis-
dom.
1 This paper is based on a longer study (see Buti et al., 2003) The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be
attributed to the institutions to which they are affiliated. The authors thank Ivo Arnold, Jakob de Haan, Lex Hoogduin, Harry
Huizinga, Lucio Pench, and Ignazio Visco for their valuable comments on this paper or on the longer study.In a way, these policy problems and debates are
related to the success of EMU rules in curbing
deficits. When the public finances in a number of
EU countries appeared to be on an unsustainable
path, the benefits of lower deficits were evident.
Fiscal discipline was recognized as a pre-condition
to lower interest rates and to use fiscal policy for
cyclical stabilization (Buti et al., 1998). The arbi-
trary nature of the 3 per cent deficit limit appeared
acceptable in view of the need to enforce fiscal
discipline. Now that deficits have been lowered, the
issue of the proper balance between fiscal discipline
and other targets has come to the fore.
Our analysis and proposals take as given the current
preferences for political integration. This implies
that fiscal policies stay decentralized and coordina-
tion continues to be mainly of the negative type (i.e.
surveillance), reflecting an enduring mistrust among
euro-area members. Obviously, if the euro increases
the taste for political integration towards a fully
fledged federal structure, a different public finance
system could be devised.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section II
analyses how the SGP qualifies against ideal stand-
ards to be met when designing a fiscal rule. Section III
examines the main proposals put forward to replace
or radically revise the Pact. In section IV, we make
some suggestions for improving the functioning of the
SGP which can be implemented within the current
institutional setting. Section V concludes.
II. FISCAL RULES FOR A MONETARY
UNION
The role of fiscal institutions and procedures in
shaping budgetary outcomes has been increasingly
recognized. While ‘good rules’ do not necessarily
entail ‘good policies’, inadequate budgetary institu-
tions and procedures may contribute to a lack of
fiscal discipline.
In a previous paper (Buti et al., 2003), we have
analysed the ‘quality’ of EU fiscal rules in terms of
the criteria identified by Kopits and Symansky
(1998) and Inman (1996) for the design, implemen-
tation, and enforcement of a fiscal rule. A good
fiscal rule should be well designed (clearly defined,
simple, transparent, consistent, and flexible), allow
effective implementation (by entailing ex-ante and
ex-post compliance and efficient monitoring), and
be enforceable (in terms of decision, amendment,
and sanctions). Our conclusion is that the SGP has
strong points, in particular as regards simplicity and
monitoring, and weak points, particularly concern-
ing enforcement. However, in order to pass a
judgement, one has to consider that the criteria
discussed in the literature were devised for assess-
ing the quality of domestic fiscal rules. With EMU,
for the first time, fiscal rules had to be devised in a
multinational context.
EMU fiscal rules reflect the interaction between the
multinational nature of EMU and the lack of a
political authority of federal rank (Balassone and
Franco, 2001). This has important implications.
First, national sovereignty and subsidiarity concerns
had to be respected. This implies that rules are to be
as neutral as possible vis-à-vis the countries’ social
preferences, which are quite heterogeneous in the
EU. This prevented, for instance, the adoption of
rules which entail a choice of the role and size of the
public sector in the economy.
Second, in a supra-national context, ex-post compli-
ance is important, given the higher risks of moral
hazard and the higher difficulty in monitoring ex-
ante policy announcements. Reputational effects,
such as those of ‘early warnings’ and excessive
deficit positions, are also important, while the imple-
mentation of formal sanctions remains under ques-
tion because of the political difficulty of imposing
them on sovereign countries.
Third, the multinational character influences the
trade-offs between the various criteria in complex
ways. Take the trade-off between simplicity and
flexibility. On the one hand, there may be a prefer-
ence for simplicity over flexibility to allow peer
pressure and central monitoring and prevent moral
hazard. On the other hand, a multiplicity of countries
increases heterogeneity and dispersion of prefer-
ences, with the consequence that a one-size-fits-all
fiscal rule is likely to be sub-optimal.
The supra-national nature of the EU fiscal rules has
to be kept in mind when considering their possible
reform.
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III. REVISITING THE SGP: MAIN
PROPOSALS
According to its critics, the Pact has several short-
comings: it reduces budgetary flexibility, works
asymmetrically, is too uniform, does not sanction
politically motivated fiscal policies, discourages
public investment, disregards the area fiscal stance,
and disregards long-term sustainability. In the end,
the Pact would hamper economic growth.
In this context, several proposals have been put
forward for replacing or modifying the Pact. One
way or another, all the proposals draw on one or
more of the above criticisms. They can be grouped
in three categories: reforms of national budgetary
procedures; coordination at the euro-area level; and
shift to different numerical rules.
(i) Reforms of National Procedures and
Institutions
The first-best strategy in ensuring sound fiscal
policies would be that of dealing directly with the
factors leading to excessive deficits at the national
level. This would avoid relying on numerical param-
eters, which are necessarily arbitrary. Fiscal policy
soundness would be ensured either by market disci-
pline or by procedures assuring fiscal responsibility
at the national level.
This strategy answers the criticism concerning the
lack of budgetary flexibility. Budgetary flexibility is
limited, especially in the transition to broadly bal-
anced budgets: in a situation of subdued growth,
such transition requires pro-cyclical policies that
may worsen the cyclical conditions. Moreover, pro-
cyclical policies cannot be excluded in the future if
the room for manoeuvre envisaged by the SGP turns
out to be insufficient to cope with large-scale reces-
sions and adverse shocks.
Two sets of proposals come under this heading.
Procedural reforms
Procedural reforms impose changes on the rules
concerning the presentation, adoption, and execu-
tion of government budgets. Hierarchical proce-
dures are more conducive to fiscal discipline than
collegial procedures. At the national level, hierarchi-
cal rules attribute strong power to the treasury
minister to overrule spending ministers during the
intra-governmental preparation of the budget, and
limit the ability of the parliament to amend the
government’s budget proposals.
Replacing the numerical limits with procedures
ensuring sound budgetary positions would raise two
problems. First, there is still a need for transparent
and rapid criteria for selecting new entrants to the
euro area. Second, the adoption of harmonized
budgetary procedures would raise problems from
the point of view of national sovereignty and might
conflict with national institutions and traditions. The
alternative solution—country-specific procedures
approved at EU level—would also be problematic.
The  ex-ante effectiveness of these procedures
would be very difficult to evaluate. Moreover, if
they did not prove effective in constraining deficits,
the attribution of responsibility would be difficult, as
national governments might argue that they have
implemented the agreed procedures.
In the end, while effective national budgetary proce-
dures are important in ensuring sound fiscal policies
at the national level, they do not appear at present to
be a viable solution at the EU level. However, some
procedural rules (such as common accounting con-
ventions or the adoption of stability programmes)
are called upon to ensure compliance with the
budget constraints.
Institutional reforms
The proposal to assign to a newly created independ-
ent body the role of setting fiscal targets draws on
the experience of central banks running monetary
policy. The independent body would aim at deliver-
ing both long-term stability/sustainability and flex-
ible short-term stabilization. Setting up such institu-
tions would imply a principal–agent solution for the
fiscal discipline problem.
Wyplosz (2002) suggests allocating to a Fiscal
Policy Committee (FPC) the responsibility for set-
ting the budget balance on the basis of a debt-
sustainability constraint defined over a number of
years. The constraint would either be expressed as
an obligation to achieve budget balance over the
cycle or to reduce or stabilize the debt ratio over a
given horizon. The FPC would be accountable to
parliament. In order to replace the existing EU rules,
each country would have to adopt a statute for the103
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new body compatible with agreed norms. The FPC’s
statute would indicate its goals and powers, and the
conditions under which deviations from its goals are
allowed.
While intellectually appealing, this proposal runs into
serious feasibility problems. Fiscal policy is—differ-
ently from monetary policy—at the heart of the
political decision-making process. The separation
between setting a target for the budget balance (to
be entrusted to the FPC) and the allocative and
distributive functions (to remain in the responsibility
of government and parliament) may turn out to be
difficult. Decisions about the budget balance affect
the composition of expenditure and revenues. Politi-
cally, it is hard to conceive that a minister of finance
would delegate part of fiscal policy authority to an
independent agency.
(ii) Fiscal Policy Coordination at the Euro-area
Level
A second category of reform proposals envisages
fiscal coordination at the euro-area level. In a
currency union, only the aggregate fiscal stance is
relevant for the policy mix at the euro-area level and,
as such, enters the reaction function of the central
bank. Hence, it is suggested that a target is set for
the euro area as a whole and then shared between
member countries.
These solutions respond to the allegation that the
SGP disregards the aggregate fiscal stance. Under
the Pact, each country is responsible for national
fiscal policies. However, the aggregation of nation-
ally determined fiscal policies may not result in an
optimal fiscal stance at the euro-area level.
Fiscal coordination can be achieved either via com-
munity-level decisions indicating the desirable budget
balance of each country or a market-based allocation
of national deficit shares of the total euro-area deficit.
Community allocation of deficit shares
A proposal for a coordination mechanism in the
budgetary domain was submitted by the French
Finance Minister at the informal Ecofin Council in
April 1999. The proposal stressed that the aggre-
gate policy stance at the EMU level must be exam-
ined on the basis of an aggregate stability pro-
gramme. It pointed out that the objective of achiev-
ing an adequate policy stance for EMU as a whole
should be taken into account when examining the
national stability programmes.
A natural implication of this is that the 3 per cent of
GDP deficit criterion would only apply to the aver-
age deficit for the euro area. Member states would
be permitted to overshoot the 3 per cent deficit
ceiling if there were other countries with deficits
below that value. Since the amplitude of cyclical
fluctuations is much smaller for the Eurozone as a
whole, the targets needed to prevent an overshoot-
ing of the aggregate deficit ceiling would be less
stringent than those necessary for each member
state individually.
However, in the present institutional set-up of EMU,
the deficit criterion applies to each member state
individually. The Maastricht budgetary rules would
thus have to be renegotiated in order to allow this
interpretation to be implemented. Bureaucratic allo-
cation of deficit shares would be highly controver-
sial. Moreover, if the norm for budgetary behaviour
in EMU is that of relying on automatic stabilizers, the
likelihood that the aggregation of the national fiscal
stances gives rise to an inappropriate stance at the
aggregate level is negligible.
In sum, while a shift to numerical constraints apply-
ing to the euro area as a whole is politically infeasible
and probably economically undesirable, a move
towards a framework which encompasses an as-
sessment of the fiscal stance of the euro area as a
whole prior to that of the individual members could
be envisaged (Buti and Nava, 2003). However,
steps in this direction should not lead to a relaxation
of national fiscal responsibility.
Market allocation of deficit permits
Casella (2001) proposes to use market mechanisms
in the allocation of ‘deficit shares’ in EMU. Having
chosen an aggregate target for the Union and an
initial distribution of tradable deficit permits, EMU
countries could be allowed to trade rights to deficit
creation. While this system keeps the aggregate
area-wide deficit unchanged, it allows individual
member states to deviate from the initial allowances
in case of idiosyncratic shocks. If a country is hit by
a negative shock, it can use fiscal policy to counter-
act the shock by buying permits from countries with
a surplus.104
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The mechanism would minimize the aggregate cost
of compliance with the aggregate targets and pro-
vide rewards for countries running surpluses in
favourable cyclical conditions, thereby tackling the
issue of the asymmetric working of the Pact (Buti
and Martinot, 2000). It would also reduce the room
for political manipulation.
This scheme is subject to three main difficulties.
First, efficacy requires that the deficits of the vari-
ous governments generate the same externality and
are thus perfect substitutes. But the risk of trigger-
ing a financial crisis is not uniform across govern-
ments. Second, the efficiency of the market in
permits depends on how competitive it is. This
makes the mechanism ill-suited to situations in
which the number of governments is small. Finally,
there is no easy solution to the problem of determin-
ing the initial allotment of permits. The possible
criteria (GDP, population, etc.) would produce greatly
differing allocations. If the initial demand for permits
exceeded the supply, then the countries with an
allotment greater than their requirement would en-
joy positional rents.
(iii) Alternative Numerical Rules: Factoring in
the ‘Quality’ of Public Finances
Numerical constraints on domestic fiscal policy in
terms of an indicator of overall fiscal performance
are more suited to the multinational context of EMU,
in which moral-hazard issues are quite relevant, and
to the need for rapid results. Compliance to numeri-
cal rules is somewhat simpler to evaluate.
Numerical rules can be divided into two groups. The
first includes rules of a static nature, concerning the
level and composition of the public budget in a
specific year. The second includes the rules of more
dynamic nature, referring to debt development and
fiscal sustainability. The two categories are respec-
tively examined in this section and in section III(iv).
The SGP focuses on the yearly budget balance.
However, a growing body of literature points out
that the composition of public finances matters as
well. The focus on quality has been translated into
two proposals for reforming the SGP: shifting from
a deficit target to (a) an expenditure target/rule, or
moving to (b) the so-called golden rule of deficit
financing.
Expenditure rules
Focus on expenditure has the advantage of control-
lability because expenditure depends much less than
revenue on the business cycle. Expenditure rules
can link the annual budgetary process to a multi-
annual policy framework. They refer to the budget-
ary items that governments can control and which
can be easily defined and monitored. Moreover,
they allow stabilizers to work on the revenue side
and may prevent expenditure relaxation in upturns.
Ideally, expenditure rules should use a comprehen-
sive definition of public expenditure, including both
discretionary items and entitlements, and apply to
the different levels of government. They should
require both ex-ante and ex-post compliance. De-
viations in one year should be compensated in the
following years.
The use of expenditure rules in a multinational
context, however, appears problematic. First, uni-
form spending rules would de facto impose homo-
geneous social preferences on politically heteroge-
neous countries, while country-specific rules would
be difficult to enforce. Second, spending norms do
not refer to the fiscal variables which can produce
negative externalities. While a rising deficit or debt
level in one country can create area-wide problems,
a rising expenditure level as such does not have
negative repercussions on other countries. More-
over, expenditure rules cannot prevent deficit and
debt increases stemming from tax cuts. Therefore,
they would have to be complemented by a deficit or
debt rule. Third, since no uniform expenditure-to-
GDP ratio can be prescribed, countries would be
required to indicate targets for the expenditure ratio
consistent with the desired deficit ratio. Finally, the
size of the budget typically reflects the political
preferences of the government. A new government
may want to renegotiate the commitments of its
predecessor.
In sum, while expenditure rules may prove useful at
the national level, they are more appropriate as
complements rather than substitutes for rules on
deficits and debt.
The golden rule
A number of authors have suggested replacing the
SGP by some form of golden rule (Blanchard and
Giavazzi, 2003). Borrowing would be allowed to105
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finance public investment. As already pointed out by
Musgrave (1939), implementing the golden rule
requires establishing a dual budget, separating in-
vestment spending from current spending.
The golden rule would allow spreading the burden of
capital projects over the different generations of
taxpayers benefiting from them and would avoid the
efficiency loss caused by distortionary taxation if
the tax rate fluctuates over time. This would answer
some of the criticisms expressed against the SGP.
In fact, maintaining budget positions ‘close to bal-
ance or in surplus’ implies that capital expenditure
will have to be funded from current revenues, which
may imply a disincentive to undertake projects
producing deferred benefits. The disincentive is
stronger during consolidation periods.
However, there are a number of arguments against
the introduction of the golden rule (Balassone and
Franco, 2000; Buiter, 2001).
First, the alleged incompatibility between the SGP
and a properly defined golden rule is questionable. In
order to spread the burden of capital spending over
the different generations of taxpayers, the rule
would have to refer to net spending.2 While com-
monly agreed estimates of amortization are not
available, in developed countries in which infra-
structures are partly developed by subjects not
included in general government, the level of net
investment seems limited and not necessarily incon-
sistent with the close-to-balance rule of the SGP.3
Second, if applied to gross public investment, the
golden rule would be an obstacle to deficit and debt
reduction. Given the ratio of public investment as a
percentage of GDP, the long-run equilibrium level of
government debt could be quite high, especially in an
environment of low inflation.
Third, singling out public investment from other
budget items makes little sense. What is important
is overall capital accumulation in both private and
public capital. For instance, a well-devised tax
reform that, by lowering the tax burden and distor-
tions, leads to higher investment may be preferable
to public investment. Moreover, there is no clear
evidence in the empirical literature that investment
in public infrastructure always leads to significant
positive growth effects. Some studies suggest that
government investment may be subject to rapidly
decreasing returns (see, for example, de la Fuente,
1997). From the standpoint of intergenerational
equity, it is not clear that a combination of higher
infrastructure investment and higher public debt
would necessarily be preferable to lower invest-
ment with lower debt. Moreover, a golden rule may
distort expenditure decisions in favour of physical
assets and against spending on intangibles that can
make a relevant contribution to economic growth,
for example those increasing human capital.
Finally, the golden rule would make the multilateral
surveillance process more complex by providing
leeway for opportunistic behaviour, since govern-
ments would have an incentive to classify current
expenditure as capital spending.
(iv) Alternative Numerical Rules: Focus on
Debt Level and Sustainability
The current EU rules do not focus on the issue of
sustainability and disregard the fact that countries
are different. This criticism has different nuances.
First, the SGP focuses almost exclusively on short-
term objectives for the budget deficit. As such, it
provides incentives for creative accounting and
one-off measures which blur the transparency of
public accounts. Second, the stock of public debt
does not enter the SGP and neither do the contingent
liabilities of public pension systems. Hence, the Pact
treats equally countries with different medium- and
long-term prospects and different debt levels. Third,
the Pact may prevent countries from implementing
policies—such as pension reforms—which improve
long-term sustainability and at the price of a short-
term deficit worsening.4
Two solutions have been put forward in the litera-
ture: the first is to choose a medium-term target that
ensures long-term sustainability while taking on
board country specificities; the second is to give
more weight to the public debt.
2 Indeed, it is only the net addition to public capital that should be financed via borrowing, while the part that covers depreciation
should remain tax-financed. See HM Treasury (1998), Kilpatrick (2001), and Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003).
3 For Germany, see Wendorff (2001).
4 For a theoretical model, see Razin and Sadka (2002).106
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From the Maastricht parameters to tax smooth-
ing
As catching-up countries are characterized by higher
potential growth and higher inflation (the latter
owing to the Balassa–Samuelson effect), they can
afford to have higher deficits without endangering
the long-term sustainability of public finances. Hence,
the 3 per cent of GDP deficit ceiling and the close-
to-balance rule are over-restrictive for these coun-
tries. Given the higher public-investment needs of
less mature economies, the current fiscal rules could
harm the catching-up process.
Buiter and Grafe (2003) propose a Permanent
Balance Rule which would ensure sustainability and
fiscal prudence while taking into account country
differences. Their rule is a strong form of tax
smoothing: it requires that the inflation-and-real-
growth-adjusted permanent government budget is
in balance or surplus. The permanent budget bal-
ance is given by the difference between the con-
stant long-run average future values of tax revenue
and government spending.
While the rule is theoretically appealing, its applica-
bility appears doubtful (Pench, 2003). First, it re-
quires an estimate of the permanent value of tax and
spending, thereby requiring the taking into account
of future social and political preferences and the
making of assumptions on future growth rates. This
would likely violate the criteria of simplicity and
enforceability discussed in section II. Second, nomi-
nal GDP growth can be higher in catching-up
economies but also highly variable. This implies a
potential conflict between discipline and stabilization.
If a country which maintains a high structural deficit
is hit by a shock, the automatic stabilizers may lead
to very high deficits. While in principle these deficits
are of a cyclical nature, the risk of spiralling debt and
interest payments should not be disregarded. This
risk is particularly high in accession countries which
still suffer from limited creditworthiness and may
see capital inflows dry up quickly.
More weight on the public debt
A way to overcome the uniformity of the Pact is to
attribute more importance to public debt. Calmfors
and Corsetti (2002) suggest making the deficit
ceiling dependent on the stock of debt. The deficit
ceiling of 3 per cent of GDP should apply only to
countries with a debt ratio in excess of 55 per cent
of GDP (see also EEAG, 2003). A higher ceiling
would apply to countries with lower debt. For
instance, a ceiling of 4 per cent of GDP would be set
for countries with a stock of debt between 35 and 45
per cent.
This proposal respects the requirement of simplicity
while improving incentives and country differentia-
tion. It would be ‘enlargement friendly’ as most of
the newcomers have a fairly low stock of debt.
However, it would require a change in the Treaty.
As we argue in the next section, a similar debt–
deficit articulation could be obtained through a
system of ‘rainy-day funds’.
Tackling the issue head on, Pisani-Ferry (2002)
suggests giving countries the choice of opting out of
the Excessive Deficit Procedure and embracing a
Debt Sustainability Pact.5 This Pact would allow
countries keeping their debts below 50 per cent of
GDP and publishing comprehensive fiscal accounts
to be exempted from the standard excessive deficit
procedure and sanctions. Fiscal accounts would
provide estimates of the future impact of budgetary
commitments, such as the financing needs of public
pay-as-you-go pension schemes. Better fiscal ac-
counting would provide more discipline by the finan-
cial markets.
The countries adopting the Debt Sustainability Pact
would be required to submit a medium-term pro-
gramme indicating a 5-year target for the debt ratio,
which would represent the benchmark for assessing
their results. They would have greater flexibility in
the short term. The focus of EU monitoring would
shift from the year-by-year monitoring of the deficit
to a medium-term perspective based on long-term
fiscal sustainability.
This proposal, however, is also somewhat problem-
atic. First, although targets for the debt ratio may
install incentives for governments in the long term,
there may be some room for manipulation, by, for
example, sale-and-lease-back constructions. More-
over, the proposal is built on the assumption that
5 See also Coeré and Pisani-Ferry (2003). Gros (2003) proposes setting a debt target for each country coupled with a commitment
to reduce the distance between their existing debt ratio and that target by one-twentieth each year.107
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deficits do not matter in EMU if debt levels are
under control. This, however, is doubtful, especially
from a policy-mix standpoint. Second, while greater
reference to the debt ratio does not raise measure-
ment problems, reference to implicit liabilities is
more problematic. Estimates are subject to consid-
erable uncertainty related to the macroeconomic,
demographic, and behavioural scenarios.
None the less, disregard of the issue of public debt
is a clear limitation of the SGP. As argued below,
this dimension could be reintegrated without over-
hauling the current fiscal rules.
IV. REVISITING THE SGP:
WORKABLE IMPROVEMENTS
(i) Lessons from the Debate
Each of the proposals examined above draws atten-
tion to one or more potentially serious problems with
the design and implementation of the SGP. The
suggestion of implementing institutional and proce-
dural reform highlights the need for an independent
enforcer. The idea of moving to a golden rule
stresses the need to preserve the growth aspect of
the SGP. A number of proposals highlight the
excessive uniformity of the current rules. Taking
into account the different levels of public debt points
to the need to insert the sustainability dimension into
the core of the SGP. The idea of an aggregate
stability programme highlights the need to take into
account the euro-area dimension when assessing
national budgetary policies. The proposal for estab-
lishing a market for deficit permits tackles the
problem of the pro-cyclical bias in good times.
However, none of the proposals put forward in the
literature represents a Pareto improvement. While
appropriate to some of the problems highlighted in
the debate, none of them solves all problems, and
each may even aggravate some of them. Also, ‘first-
best’ solutions at the national level may end up being
‘third best’ when transposed to a supra-national
context. Finally, from a political perspective, attempt-
ing to rewrite the rules from scratch may lead to a
vacuum in which the current rules are suspended
while none of the alternative options is supported by
a sufficiently large political constituency.
Our analysis of the SGP against desirable rules
standards for design and compliance shows that the
current EU fiscal rules fare reasonably well, espe-
cially if account is taken of their multinational char-
acter. None the less, improvements can be achieved.
In our view, key aspects are allowing a certain
country-specificity, re-balancing their sticks and
carrots, and enhancing enforcement mechanisms.
(ii) A Pragmatic Way Forward
Our proposal involves a diversification of the me-
dium-term targets, higher transparency and better
monitoring, mechanisms to correct misbehaviour in
good times, and a non-partisan application of the
rules.
A country-by-country articulation of the me-
dium-term budgetary target
The close-to-balance rule interpreted as broadly
balanced budgets in cyclically adjusted terms may
lead to excessive uniformity between countries. It
treats equally countries with different debt levels,
contingent liabilities, and public-investment needs.
So far, countries are only differentiated in the
variability of the cyclical component of the budget
balance: economies subject to higher business-cy-
cle volatility and having larger automatic stabilizers
require a larger cyclical safety margin in order to
avoid breaching the 3 per cent of GDP deficit ceiling
under normal cyclical circumstances (EC, 2002a).
The articulation of the medium-term budgetary
targets could be extended to (a) the financial fragil-
ity of the country embodied in its stock of public debt
and (b) the threat to long-term sustainability given
by the implicit liabilities of pension systems.
Countries with a relatively low stock of debt—i.e.
well below the 60 per cent of GDP reference
value—and with relatively low estimated contingent
liabilities, could be allowed to have cyclically ad-
justed budget deficits up to their minimal bench-
marks. This solution would be consistent, in most
cases, with a prudent version of the golden rule.
Commonly agreed estimates of contingent liabilities
in EU countries would have to be computed. Coun-
tries would have to provide transparent projections
on a regular basis.6 The possibility of having a small
6 It would also be useful to attribute the responsibility for projections to independent authorities or to competing institutions
(see Franco and Marino, 2002).108
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structural deficit could be limited to the countries for
which expenditure trends do not imply a debt level
rising above the 60 per cent threshold over a certain
period of time.
The debt ratio in high-debt countries and in countries
with expected rising expenditure levels would de-
cline fast, thereby contributing to offset the burden
of ageing in the future, while in the other countries
deficit levels would ensure the maintenance of a
small public debt.
Improving transparency
An effort should be devoted to enhancing transpar-
ency in current and prospective fiscal accounts. In
general, transparency can increase the credibility of
rules by allowing a better judgement of fiscal per-
formance and by limiting the role of accounting
creativity in meeting targets.
The current EMU fiscal framework has been criti-
cized for lack of transparency. This issue has
different facets. First, in order to meet the short-
term targets, countries have frequently adopted
one-off, cash-raising measures instead of making
the necessary structural adjustment. Second, under
the current system of national accounts, monitoring
is hampered by delays in data provision, with the
implication that the whistle is often blown far too
late. Third, data on off-budget liabilities and budget-
ary prospects have generally been rather limited.
To remedy the first problem, the Commission sug-
gested that compliance with the EU rules should
distinguish between long-lasting and one-off meas-
ures (EC, 2002b). Given the current legislation and
accounting conventions, the 3 per cent rule cannot
be modified to allay this concern. However, in
evaluating fiscal positions, the existence of tempo-
rary measures should be considered.
The problem of early detection of deviations from
targets was vividly exposed in the case of Portugal
in 2001. Moreover, one can see that public-debt
growth has frequently exceeded the deficit level.
Stock-flow effects have systematically contributed
to debt growth. A way to tackle this issue is to
resurrect, in parallel with national accounts defini-
tions, regular monitoring of cash flows (Balassone
et al., 2002). National authorities would be required
to indicate ex-ante cash figures broadly consistent
with the European system of national accounts
(ESA95) balance. Alternatively, changes in the debt
level (net of the effects of exchange-rate changes
and privatization proceeds) could be monitored. If a
significant departure from target is detected in
financial flows, it would be up to them to explain this
difference.
Finally, on the basis of an agreed and transparent
framework, governments could be required to pro-
vide estimates of off-budget liabilities, of their net
asset position, and of long-term budgetary trends.
Estimates should be revised every year. Changes
should be explained.
Tackling misbehaviour in good time
It is widely recognized that the SGP does not provide
sufficient incentives for countries to run prudent
fiscal policies in good times. Within the boundaries
of the current rules, a two-pronged approach could
be the following: first, devise a sanction to punish early
slippages in good times and, second, make it easier for
countries to behave prudently in periods of upturn.
In order to step up peer pressure, a possible solution
could be that of using the early warning procedure
of the SGP not only in bad times, when the deficit
approaches the 3 per cent ceiling, but also in good
times when a significant divergence from structural
targets is detected.
The introduction of rainy-day funds may improve
policies in good times. These are reserve funds that
would be used in times of recession and replenished
in upturns. Rainy-day funds are used by several US
states and Canadian provinces to buffer the effects
of unexpected negative events and cyclical down-
turns (Knight and Levinson, 1999). These funds
might increase the incentive for governments not to
waste the surpluses in good times and increase the
room for manoeuvre in bad times. They would also
increase the role of public budgets in stabilizing the
economy over the cycle. The possibility of accumu-
lating such funds could be made a function of the
country’s level of public debt. For instance, it could
be open only to countries with a stock of debt below
a certain debt threshold, and the allowed maximum
size of accumulated funds could be increased the
lower the stock of debt. This would de-facto make
the deficit ceiling a negative function of the debt
ratio.109
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The establishment of rainy-day funds would imply a
review of the current ESA accounting rules for
calculating budgetary indicators. Transfers of re-
sources to and withdrawals from the fund would
now be considered financial operations (below the
line) and hence deficit-neutral. A revised interpre-
tation should establish that transfer of resources to
the fund in good times reduces the budget surplus,
while withdrawal from the fund in bad times is
considered as additional revenue and thus reduces
the deficit. There should be some rule to ensure that
rainy-day funds are used only in recessions.
The possibility of establishing rainy-day funds would
not obviously tackle at the root the incentive problem
that governments have in good times. However, the
flexibility that they would provide would allow a
tightening of sanctioning procedures for countries
exceeding the 3 per cent limit. For instance, the
payment of the non-interest-bearing deposit could
be accelerated and the closeness clause (the amount
by which the 3 per cent limit can be exceeded) could
be defined in a strict way.
Non-partisan implementation of the rules
A strong criticism of EMU rules is that enforcement
is partisan: national authorities are supposed to apply
the rules to themselves, thereby having incentives
for collusion and horse-trading.
In order to move to a non-partisan implementation of
the rules, one has to distinguish between three types
of decisions which need to be taken in the implemen-
tation of the SGP: (a) technical decisions on the
compliance with the rules; (b) political decisions on
measures to be taken to prevent or correct an
excessive deficit; (c) implementation of sanctions.
The Commission should be entrusted with the imple-
mentation of decision (a). It should be entitled to
deliver the first early warning, and to determine the
existence of an excessive deficit. The Commission,
without requiring approval by the Council, would
also assess whether exceptional circumstances
apply.
The Council should take decision (b) on the meas-
ures to be implemented to correct the fiscal imbal-
ance. Hence, the Council should decide on the
second early warning which requires the specifica-
tion of the corrective measures. As prescribed by
current rules, the decision would be taken by the
Council on a qualified majority basis following a
recommendation by the Commission.
Decision (c), on the application of sanctions, is of
both a technical and a political nature. Leaving it
exclusively to the Commission would be unthink-
able. A solution that would reduce the risk of a
partisan (non-) application of sanctions would be to
move from a Commission recommendation to a
Commission proposal. The difference is that the
Council can move away from the Commission
proposal only with unanimity and not with qualified
majority as in the case of a Commission recommen-
dation.
These changes are consistent with the spirit of the
current rules. However, in order to be implemented
fully, a change in the Treaty would be required. If
agreement on the principle is achieved, this could be
enshrined in a European Council resolution which
would state that, in the case of the technical deci-
sions, the Council commits itself to rejecting the
Commission recommendations only with unanimity.
The crucial question is, of course, whether or not the
Council is prepared to strengthen the authority of the
Commission in the interest of the credibility of EU
fiscal rules.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The SGP’s aim is to balance fiscal discipline and
fiscal stabilization in a multinational context in which
countries ultimately remain responsible for fiscal
policy. It tries to combine some flexibility for excep-
tional events with a need for predefining the neces-
sary room for manoeuvre to smooth the business
cycle.
While the Pact presents some drawbacks—par-
ticularly in terms of investment financing, asymmet-
ric incentives, and lack of a long-term view—it is not
evident that any alternative would be preferable on
every account. Most of the benefits of alternative
rules can be attained by an appropriate interpreta-
tion of the SGP provisions which would diversify
countries’ fiscal commitments according to their
specific economic and public-finance features.110
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Our basic tenet is that there are no miracle solutions
to cure the Pact’s weaknesses. Changes might
obviously regard the specific values of the param-
eters, but not the underlying philosophy—that is,
setting a prudent budgetary objective in normal
times and a deficit ceiling in bad times.
Only 4 years into EMU, any radical change would
be highly problematic from a political standpoint.
The obvious risk is that of ending up in a vacuum in
which the old rules are called into question while the
agreement on a new set of rules fails to materialize.
Venturing into an EMU without fiscal rules would
be a leap in the dark. At the same time, given the
current level of political integration, the conditions
for a federal system of public finances do not seem
to exist.
While we are sceptical of re-opening the debate on
the SGP, we think that its functioning can none the
less be improved. Our main proposals concern
redefining the medium-term budgetary targets, im-
proving transparency, tackling the pro-cyclical fis-
cal bias in good times, moving towards non-partisan
application of the rules, and improving transparency
in the data. This set of ideas can allow the achieve-
ment of both stronger discipline and higher flexibility
and can be implemented without requiring any major
revision of the existing rules. An assessment of the
aggregate fiscal position prior to the evaluation of
the individual national policies can also be consid-
ered. It may help to achieve a coherent fiscal stance
at the euro-area level, but it should not weaken the
current framework.
These proposals do not provide a recipe for tackling
the problems encountered by countries still in tran-
sition towards lower deficits in the event of a
cyclical slump. Nevertheless, if implemented, they
would limit the type of behaviour which is largely
responsible for the current fiscal tensions.
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